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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for estimation of
the parameters of a structural model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking
into account agents heterogeneity in preferences. We show that allowing the principal to
strategically distribute the production inputs across heterogenous agents as part of the
contract design, the principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract
into individualized contracts tailored to ﬁt agents’ preferences or characteristics. Using
micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we ﬁnd that contracting farmers
are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion and that this heterogeneity aﬀects
the principal’s allocation of production inputs across farmers. Relying on the identifying
assumption that contracts are optimal, we obtain the estimates of a lower and an upper
bound of agents’ reservation utilities. We show that farmers with higher risk aversion have
lower outside opportunities because of lower reservation utilities.
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11 Introduction
In many business environments, including agriculture, economic agents often interact with
each other repeatedly and business is conducted using a series of short-term contracts. The
use of contracts to vertically coordinate the production and marketing of agricultural com-
modities has become common practice in many agricultural sectors including livestock, fruits
and vegetables, tobacco, etc. To solve the asymmetric information problems between proces-
sors (principals) and independent farmers (agents), the majority of contracts use high powered
incentives schemes to compensate farmers. Another interesting characteristic of many pro-
duction contracts is that all agents contracting with the same principal are operating under
formally identical contract provisions (Levy and Vukina, 2002). However, explicitly uniform
contracts may not necessarily guarantee that all agents are treated equally. When the principal
and agents contract repeatedly, an explicitly uniform but incomplete contract leaves a possi-
bility for the principal to treat agents diﬀerently after learning about their types (abilities, risk
aversions, costs of eﬀort, etc.). Typically, these contracts specify a general payment formula
that expresses the agent’s reward as a function of his performance but in which the base pay-
ment and the incentive power of the contract depend on the provision of some inputs by the
principal. Introducing the choice of these strategic variables as part of the contract design, the
principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract into individualized contracts
tailored to ﬁt agents’ preferences or characteristics.
The objective of this paper is to study this contract design problem, to present a method
that would allow the identiﬁcation and estimation of the structural parameters of the moral
hazard model, and to test predictions aimed at assessing the empirical reliability of the model.
In order to identify the heterogeneity among agents, we assume that they have diﬀerent risk
aversion attitudes and that their preferences are observed by the principal. In the empirical
part of the paper we use a panel data containing individual settlements of livestock production
2contracts. Our analysis explains an apparent anomaly frequently observed in many agricultural
contracts which manifests itself in the principal’s use of seemingly uniform contracts for the
purposes of governing the relationships with heterogeneous agents.1
Empirical tests of contract theory are typically performed with either cross-industry and
cross-ﬁrm data or with intra-ﬁrm data. As pointed out by Chiappori and Salanié (2003), the
ﬁrst approach can provide more general empirical results but faces the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity (for the econometrician). The second type of data will generate the results
that are diﬃcult to generalize but has the advantage of dealing with agents that operate in
the same environment, which removes a lot of the potential unobserved heterogeneity. This
research belongs to the second category of studies. Our data comes from payroll records of one
company that contracts the production of live hogs with independent farmers.
The literature concerned with empirical testing of contract theory related to this paper
follows two distinct approaches. One line of research takes contracts as given and model
the behavior of the principal and the agents under the observed contractual terms without
assuming optimal contract design. For example, interesting studies in labor economics of
Paarsch and Shearer (2000, 2004) use the information on incentive contracts and longitudinal
individual outputs in order to estimate how eﬀort responds to incentives provided by the piece
rate contracts. They do not study the optimal contract design nor do they assume contract
optimality to identify the model primitives. However, certain aspects of their approach is
related to ours because they use an assumption about the contract design to identify the
1A related topic more linked to the adverse selection problem in a similar environment has been studied by
Leegomonchai and Vukina (2005). They test whether broiler companies allocate production inputs of varying
quality by providing high ability agents with high-quality inputs or by providing low ability agents with high
quality inputs. The ﬁrst strategy would stimulate the career concerns type of response on the part of the
growers, whereas the second strategy would generate a ratchet eﬀect. Their results show no signiﬁcant input
discrimination based on grower abilities that would lead to either career concerns or ratchet eﬀect type of
dynamic incentives.
3heterogeneity of agents regarding their cost of eﬀort. Their assumption is not speciﬁcally an
optimality assumption because they assume that the employer cannot discriminate between
workers according to their observable cost of eﬀort. Instead they assume that the contract is
designed to satisfy at least the participation constraint of the least able worker. Other papers
within the same paradigm include, for example, Abbring, Chiappori, Heckman, and Pinquet
(2003); and Chiappori, Durand, Geoﬀard (1998). They take advantage of the fact that they
can observe the actual contracts and eventually some changes in the contract forms, which
enable them to test various implications of moral hazard.
The other line of research in empirical testing of contract theory explicitly or implicitly
assumes that contracts are optimal. Then, it derives predictions about the determinants of
some observed contract parameters and test those predictions empirically. This approach is
often used when one does not observe all of the exact contractual terms agreed upon between a
principal and an agent. A good example of this approach is the empirical work on sharecropping
contracts where the goal is usually to test between the alternative theories of contract design,
for example the transaction cost versus the risk sharing explanation (Allen and Lueck, 1994,
Dubois, 2002, Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002).
Our paper presents the combination of the above two approaches. First, we empirically
check several testable implications of the incentive theory without assuming the contract op-
timality. The fact that we can precisely observe all relevant contract stipulations allows us to
model the agent’s behavior in a way that is consistent with the assumption that contracts are
either optimal or suboptimal.2 Second, after modeling the agent’s behavior, we analyze the
principal’s decisions and contract design. Using the identifying assumption that contracts are
2The fact that in the real economy there are many institutional constraints or bounded rationality types of
behavior that may restrain the actors to use theoretically optimal contracts has been well established in the
literature. For a discussion on optimal versus suboptimal contracts, see Chiappori and Heckman (2000), or
Chiappori and Salanié (2003).
4optimal, we obtain estimates of a lower and an upper bound on agents’ reservation utilities. We
conﬁrm that contract farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk preferences and that
this heterogeneity aﬀects the principal’s decision how to allocate the production inputs across
farmers. We also show that farmers with higher risk aversion have lower outside opportunities
due to lower reservation utilities.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on testing the trade-oﬀ between risk and incen-
tives. When it comes to the determination of contract choice, the transaction cost literature
(e.g., Allen and Lueck, 1992) claims the unimportance of risk. On the other hand, Acker-
berg and Botticini (2002) showed that if one controls for the endogenous matching between
principals and agents, the agent’s risk aversion appears to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the contract
choice. When it comes to testing whether risk imposes a constraint to oﬀering incentives the
evidence is also mixed, with some work ﬁnding evidence in favor of the theories, while other
ﬁnd little (Prendergast, 1999, 2002). In our structural model, we show that individual risk
aversion identiﬁed with the longitudinal performance data actually aﬀects the principal’s op-
timal contract choice in which she must balance the incentives and the risk sharing in a moral
hazard environment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the industry and the production
contracts that generated the contracts settlement data. Section 3 presents the theoretical
model and derives the testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical
e s t i m a t i o na n dh y p o t h e s e st e s t i n ga n dS e c t i o n5c o n c l u d e s .
2 Industry Description and Data
Swine production in the United States is characterized by an increasing presence of verti-
cally integrated ﬁrms (called integrators) that contract the production (grow-out) of hogs
with independent farmers. The contract production is dominated by large national companies
5(Smithﬁeld Foods, Premium Standard Farms, etc.,) that run their businesses through smaller
proﬁt centers that issue contracts, supply inputs and slaughter ﬁnished animals.
A production contract is an agreement between an integrator company and a farmer
(grower) that binds the farmer to speciﬁc production practices. Diﬀerent stages of produc-
tion of animals are typically covered by diﬀerent contracts and farmers generally specialize in
the production of animals under one contract. The most frequently observed contracts in the
swine industry are single production stage contracts such as farrowing contracts, nursery con-
tracts and especially ﬁnishing contracts. All production contracts have two main components:
one is the division of responsibility for providing inputs, and the other is the method used to
determine grower compensation. Growers provide land, housing facilities, utilities (electricity
and water) and labor and are also responsible for manure management and disposal of dead
animals. An integrator company provides animals, feed, medications and services of ﬁeld men.
Companies also own and operate feed mills and processing plants and provide transportation
of feed and live animals. When it comes to specifying integrator’s responsibilities for providing
inputs, the terms of the contract are intentionally vague. The integrator decides on the volume
of production both in terms of the rotations of batches on a given farm as well as the number
(density) and weight of incoming animals (feeder pigs) inside the house. A typical scheme for
compensating growers in ﬁnishing contracts is based on a base plus bonus payment per pound
of gain (live weight) transferred, where a bonus payment reﬂects some eﬃciency measure such
as feed conversion.
The data set used in this study is an unbalanced panel from Martin (1997). It contains a
sample of contract settlement data for individual growers who contracted the ﬁnishing stage of
hog production with an integrator in North Carolina. The data set spans the period between
December 1985 and April 1993, for a total of 802 observations. Each observation represents
one contract realization, i.e., the payment received and the grower performance associated with
6one batch of animals delivered to the integrator’s processing plant. There are 122 growers in
the data set and the number of observations per grower ranges from 2 to 37.3
The size of the grow-out operation (the number of ﬁnishing houses) varies across growers
between one and ﬁve houses. All houses under contract have approximately the same maximal
capacity. The median density of a house is 1,226 hogs per house and the mean density is 1,234
hogs per house. The contract coverage varies across farms and time. Sometimes one contract
will cover multiple houses on a given farm, other times each house will be covered by a separate
contract. In cases when multiple houses are covered by one contract, the grower payment is
calculated by treating all houses as one unit. The coverage of the contract is determined by
the timing of the placement and genetic composition of feeder pigs. The animals covered by
the same contract have to be placed on a given farm at the same time and have to have similar
genetic characteristics. The average length of the production cycle is approximately 19 weeks.
Counting one additional week for the necessary cleanup gives a maximum of 2.6 batches of
ﬁnished hogs per house per year. The data summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
The particular ﬁnishing contract that generated the data is fairly representative for the
industry as a whole. The contract requires that growers furnish fully equipped housing facilities
and that they follow the management and husbandry practices speciﬁed by the integrator. The
contract guarantees the grower a minimum of 7 batches of feeder pigs and is automatically
renewed unless canceled in writing. The integrator provides the grower with feeder pigs, feed,
medication, veterinary services and services of the ﬁeld personnel. The quality of all inputs
as well as the time of placement of feeder pigs and shipment of grown animals are exclusively
under control of the integrator.
The compensation to grower i for the batch of hogs under contract t, as the payment
for husbandry services and the housing facilities rental, is calculated on a per pound of gain
3It appears that the data sample has been extracted randomly from the population of all contracts that has
been settled between this integrator and her growers during this time period.
7Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
Feed conversion ratio (fit)2 . 7 6 0 . 1 5 1
Grower’s revenue in US$ (Rit) 18 886 10 022
Heads placed (Hit) 2 077 1 111
Mortality rate (mit) 0.039 0.020
Feed used in (1000) pounds (Fit)1 0 3 3 5 5 3
Weight gained in (1000) pounds (qit) 373 195
Weight of incoming feeder pigs in pounds (κ0it) 44.16 5.05
Weight of outgoing ﬁnished hogs in pounds (κit) 234.22 7.71
P r i c eo ff e e d( i nU S $p e r1 0 0p o u n d s ) 1 1 . 1 3 0 . 3
Price of hogs (in US$ per 100 pounds) 44.85 11.1
Price of feeder pigs (in US$ per 100 pounds) 83.51 14.1
Prices of feed, hogs and feeder pigs varied during the period sampled by the data.
basis with bonuses earned on a per head basis. The bonus is based on the diﬀerence between
the individual grower’s feed conversion, expressed as pounds of feed divided by pounds of
gain Fit
qit ,a n das t a n d a r df e e dc o n v e r s i o nr a t i oφ. If the grower’s ratio is above the standard,
he receives no bonus and simply earns the base piece rate α multiplied by the total pounds
gained qit. If the grower’s ratio is below the standard ratio, the diﬀerence is multiplied by a
constant β to determine the per head bonus rate. The total bonus payment is then determined
by multiplying the bonus rate by the number of pigs marketed, where the marketed pigs
(1 − mit)Hit are those feeder pigs that survived the fattening process and mit is the animal
mortality rate. Algebraically, the exact formula for the total compensation is:
Rit = αqit +m a x [ 0 ,β(φ −
Fit
qit
)(1 − mit)Hit] (1)
During the period covered by the data set some parameters of the payment mechanism (1)
have changed. The base piece rate varied with the type of feeder pigs placed on a grower
8farm. For commingled feeder pigs α =0 .0315, whereas for integrator’s own nursery feeder pigs
α =0 .0275.4 Also, as a result of technological progress in nutrition and housing design, the
feed conversion standard was lowered from φ =3 .50 to φ =3 .35. However, after the lower
feed conversion standard was introduced, the higher standard of 3.50 remained in eﬀect for
commingled pigs. Consequently, we have three diﬀerent payment schemes: (α =0 .0315,φ=
3.50), (α =0 .0275,φ=3 .50)a n d( α =0 .0275,φ=3 .35) .A l lo b s e r v e df e e dc o n v e r s i o nr a t i o s
are below the benchmark feed conversion (φ), so the truncation of the bonus payment at zero
can be harmlessly ignored and the payment scheme simpliﬁed as
Rit = αqit + β(φ −
Fit
qit
)(1 − mit)Hit. (2)
In addition to individual grower contract settlement data, the proposed methodology requires
the integrator-level price data for the inputs and the output. However, such data is not
available. Instead we use the regional market prices for feed, feeder pigs and ﬁnished hogs, also
obtained from Martin (1997). The feed prices are quarterly ﬁgures for the Appalachian region,
the feeder pig prices are monthly observations for North Carolina and the market prices for
ﬁnished hogs are monthly prices received by North Carolina farmers for barrows and gilts.5
3T h e M o d e l
We model the integrator-grower relationship in a principal-agent framework. The timing of
the contractual game played between the principal and the agent is as follows. The principal
(integrator) proposes the contract to the agents (growers) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The
contract speciﬁes the division of responsibilities for providing inputs and the payment formula.
4There are three types of feeder pigs in the data set. Commingled pigs are feeder pigs that are either bought
at an auction or from an outside source. The third type are own feeder pigs which come from the breeding stock
controlled by the integrator, hence are deemed to be of superior quality.
5The procedure to convert the quarterly prices into monthly ﬁgures and the exact matching of the monthly
prices to contract settlement dates is explained in detail in Martin (1997).
9The integrator is required to provide animals (feeder pigs) and feed and the grower is required
to provide housing for animals and labor (exert eﬀort). After the grower observes the payment
formula, the number and the weight of incoming feeder pigs supplied by the integrator, he
accepts or rejects the contract. A grower that accepted the contract then exerts eﬀort.
The tasks performed by the grower are not perfectly observable by the integrator, who
therefore faces a moral hazard problem in the delegation of production tasks. The incentives
to the grower to behave according to the principal’s objective are provided through the payment
scheme which always includes a particular type of bonus (premium) mechanism. In our data,
the bonus depends on a perfectly observable and veriﬁable performance measure which is the
feed conversion ratio. The agent’s payment (2) can then be written as a linear function of the
performance measure, i.e. the feed conversion ratio fit = Fit
qit ,s u c ht h a t
Rit =˜ αit − ˜ βit (fit − φ) (3)
where the ﬁxed component (˜ αit)a n dt h es l o p e( ˜ βit)o ft h i sl i n e a rf u n c t i o nd e p e n do ns o m e
parameters as
˜ αit =˜ αit (κ0it,H it)=αqit = α[κit (1 − mit) − κ0it]Hit (4)
˜ βit = ˜ βit (Hit)=β(1 − mit)Hit (5)
with κit being the weight of outgoing ﬁnished hogs, κ0it the weight of incoming feeder pigs,
and Hit the number of heads of animals placed on the farm. When the principal proposes
the contract to the agent, he proposes the payment scheme (3) where parameters ˜ αit and ˜ βit
are known. Thus, at the time the agent has to accept or reject the contract, the contractual
payment consists of a ﬁxed payment ˜ αit, and a premium part which is tied to the performance
(φ − fit) w i t ht h ek n o w ni n c e n t i v ep o w e r˜ βit. After accepting the contract, the agent exerts
eﬀort.
We consider that the parameters of this aﬃne function are ﬁxed at the time the grower
10chooses his eﬀort and that the only source of risk comes form the performance in terms of
feed conversion. The assumption that the parameters ˜ αit and ˜ βit depend on conditions and
variables known and observed by the grower when he chooses his eﬀort is reasonable. Actually,
t h eg r o w e ra l w a y so b s e r v e st h en u m b e rHit and the weight κ0it of feeder pigs when they arrive
on the farm. The grower also knows that the pigs are grown until they reach their target
weight κit. Finally, the grower can accurately judge the mortality rate mit by observing the
genetic make-up and the overall condition of feeder pigs delivered to the farm and the density
at which they are stocked. Empirically, we see that there is actually very little variation in
mortality rates given Hit and little variation in the weight κit of ﬁnished animals. Thus, it is
true that ˜ αit and ˜ βit are known as soon as Hit and κ0it are known.
3.1 Agent’s behavior
We assume that grower i’s preferences over revenue Rit and eﬀort eit at period t are described
by the utility function Ui(Rit − C(eit)) which is known by the principal. C(.) is a positive
increasing function implying that eﬀort is costly. We assume that growers exhibit constant
absolute risk aversion such that Ui(Rit − C(eit)) = −1
θi exp−θi(Rit − C(eit)) where θi > 0 is
the absolute risk aversion parameter, and also assume that the stochastic revenue is normally
distributed. Under these assumptions, grower i’s expected utility can be expressed as an
increasing concave function of the mean-variance criterion (which corresponds to the certainty






Va r R it − C(eit). (6)
Notice that the curvature of the utility function is grower-speciﬁc which allows much more
ﬂexibility than when the curvature is common to all agents, i.e. when θi is constant across i.
First, let’s specify how the observed outcome stochastically depends on the unobservable
11grower eﬀort and assume that
fit (eit) − φ =( λ − eit)uit (7)
where λ reﬂects some ﬁxed ability parameter of growers, eit is a costly eﬀort which improves
(reduces) the feed conversion ratio, and uit is an i.i.d. (across growers and periods) normal
production shock with mean 1 and variance σ2.T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation shows that a unit of eﬀort is
worth one unit of feed conversion ratio which gets transformed into revenue through ˜ βit.S i n c e
the cost of eﬀort is monetary, it must be in the same units as revenue, hence we specify
C(eit)=γ˜ βiteit
where 0 <γ<1.6
Next, using (3) and (7) we can write the agent’s certainty equivalent of net revenue as





itVa r[fit] − γ˜ βiteit (8)











Given (7), it is clear that
Efit − φ = λ − eit
Va r[fit]=( λ − eit)
2 σ2






As standard in incentive problems, equation (9) reveals that more risk averse growers, i.e. those
with higher θi, exert lower equilibrium eﬀort, and also that stronger incentives power (−˜ βit)
6Notice that the apparently more general speciﬁcation fit −φ =( λ−ρeit)uit is not diﬀerent from the chosen
o n eb e c a u s ew ec o u l ds i m p l yr e d e ﬁne eﬀort as e eit = ρeit whose cost will be
γ
ρ
˜ βite eit instead of γ˜ βiteit.
12increases eﬀort. Notice also that our speciﬁcation implies that optimal eﬀort is only aﬀected
by the incentives power of the contract (−˜ βit) and not by the constant part of the payment
e αit. This result has a simple consequence for the equilibrium strategy that the integrator
(principal) would pursue when it comes to deciding how many feeder pigs to allocate to each
grower (agent) according to his risk aversion.
3.2 Principal’s choices
Now, we model the principal’s behavior taking into account the agent’s optimal response. We
assume that the principal is risk neutral and maximizes the expected proﬁtp e rg r o w e r .
The integrator’s proﬁt function is given by:
πit = pQit − wFFit − Rit (Hit,κ 0it) − wH (κ0it)Hit (10)
where p is the market price of hogs, Qit = κit (1 − mit)Hit is the total live weight removed
from the grower’s farm, Rit (Hit,κ 0it) is the grower payment, wF is the market price of feed
and wH (κ0it) is the market price of feeder pigs of weight κ0it.
By deciding how many feeder pigs (Hit)o fw e i g h tκ0it to place on a grower’s farm, the prin-
cipal can vary the contract parameters ˜ αit and ˜ βit. As mentioned before, the contracts between
the integrator and all agents have the same structure (summarized by the payment scheme
(2)), but the allocation of integrator-supplied inputs among growers of diﬀerent characteristics
is not stipulated in the general contract and the integrator can choose them unilaterally in
his dealings with each individual grower. Within the class of contractual payments that are
observed in the data, varying the quantity and quality of production inputs across growers al-
lows the integrator to use his bargaining power in designing individual incentive contracts for
each grower. Notice that in modeling the principal’s behavior one can either use a constrained
optimality argument by saying that the principal has to choose within the class of payment
functions (2) that are empirically observed. This approach will generate some prediction about
13the principal’s "constrained" optimal choices. Alternatively, one can also argue that principals
are not legally constrained to use any particular form of payments to agents and therefore those
payment schemes that are observed are in fact optimal. Then, one can use the assumption that
the observed contracts are actually optimal to identify some additional agents’ heterogeneity
attributes.
As required by the theory, optimal contracts should depend on agent’s preferences and her
outside opportunities. In particular, the incentive power of the contract in a moral hazard en-
vironment should depend on the particular trade-oﬀ between risk sharing and incentives that
depends on the agent’s preferences, whereas the ﬁxed component of the contractual payment
should depend on the agent’s reservation utility. As agent’s preferences (risk aversion) and
reservation utilities (depending on outside options and preferences) are likely to be heteroge-
nous, we expect that the principal will tailor particular incentive contracts according to the
agent’s types. The speciﬁcation used enables the partitioning of the eﬀects of risk aversion and
reservation utilities into the constant and variable parts of the payment.
The problem faced by the integrator is to choose the contract parameters in order to
maximize his proﬁt under the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints




Eπit = E[pQit − wFFit − Rit (Hit,κ 0it,e it) − wH (κ0it)Hit]
subject to
EUi(Rit − C(e∗
it)|κ0it,H it) ≥ Ui
and
e∗
it =a r gm a x
eit
EUi(Rit (Hit,κ 0it) − C(eit)|κ0it,H it)
where Ui is the reservation utility of agent i,a n dRit (Hit,κ 0it,e it)=˜ αit (κ0it,H it)−˜ βit (Hit)(fit(eit) − φ).
14Using the certainty equivalent of the agent’s utility like in Section 3.1, the principal’s
maximization program is thus equivalent to
max
Hit,κ0it
E [πit (Hit,κ 0it)] = E[pQit − wFFit − Rit (Hit,κ 0it,e it) − wH (κ0it)Hit]
subject to




it =a r gm a x
eit
Wi(Rit (Hit,κ 0it),e it)
where Wi = U−1
i (Ui) and the function Wi(.) is deﬁn e da si n( 8 ) . N o w ,o n ec a ni n c o r p o r a t e
the incentive constraint in the proﬁt function of the principal by replacing the eﬀort level by




it (Hit,κ 0it)=E[pQit − wFFit(e∗
it) − Rit (Hit,κ 0it,e ∗
it) − wH (κ0it)Hit]
subject to
Wi(Rit (Hit,κ 0it),e ∗
it) ≥ Wi
where π∗
it denotes the proﬁt function that incorporates the incentive constraint.
Assuming the contracts are optimal, one does not have to solve the above principal’s prob-
lem to determine the equilibrium contractual terms (H∗
it,κ ∗
0it) a saf u n c t i o no fo b s e r v e dv a r i -
ables because one can use the directly observed values of H∗
it and κ∗
0it. However, one has to
determine whether the participation constraint is binding or not. If the principal can only
choose κ0it and Hit to maximize proﬁt and if he has to use the payment formula in (2), then
there is no reason for the participation constraint to be binding. Actually, one can see that the
choice of κ0it and Hit moves the parameters of the linear payment ˜ αit and ˜ βit t h es a m ew a ya s
the principal could do by choosing ˜ αit and ˜ βit directly, but unlike in the standard principal-
agent models, κ0it and Hit also change some other component of the principal’s proﬁt function.
15However, if manipulating the choice variables makes the participation constraint not binding,
the principal can easily make it binding by adding or subtracting a ﬁxed transfer Tit to the
agent’s revenue Rit. Adding such a constant does not change the incentive constraint (as shown
by the expression for the optimal eﬀort (9)), thus the principal can perform the maximization
program by incorporating only the incentive constraint and then ask for a ﬁxed transfer from
the agent in case the participation constraint is not binding.
Therefore, since we exactly observe the contract agreed between the principal and the agent,




























it (Hit,κ 0it), and then exploit the binding participation constraint
(11) obtained under the assumption that contracts are optimal in order to derive additional
testable implications.
3.2.1 Optimal choice of contract parameters and agents heterogeneity
In order to characterize the principal’s maximization program, we need to examine the func-
tional forms of the cost function for feeder pigs wH (κ0) and the mortality function mit (H).
Towards this objective, we introduce two assumptions:
16• Assumption 1: wH (.) is increasing convex.
A s s u m p t i o n1i sl i k e l yt ob es a t i s ﬁed if wH (κ0) reﬂects the cost of raising live animals
to weight κ0 because feed conversion rapidly worsens (increases) with heavier animals and
therefore the feeding costs progressively increase as animals grow larger. Price data on diﬀerent
weights of feeder pigs show that this assumption is generally satisﬁed.
• Assumption 2: mit (Hit) is increasing concave with m00(1 − m)+2 m02 ≥ 0 and 2m0 +
m00H>0.
In Assumption 2 we assume that the mortality rate function mit (Hit) is such that the proﬁt
function has a unique maximum (H∗
it(θi),κ ∗
0it(θi)). It is obvious that the number of animals
placed on a grower’s farm cannot be inﬁnite given that the housing facilities are of ﬁnite size.
The mortality rate will be increasing and necessarily approaching 100% when H approaches
inﬁnity. This implies that proﬁts will obtain at a maximum for H<∞.
If we label the number of animals shipped (i.e., the number of animals that survived the
fattening process) as Hs
it =( 1− mit (Hit))Hit, then the condition 2m0 + m00H>0 is simply
equivalent to Hs00
it (Hit) < 0, which means that the number of animals survived Hs
it(Hit) is a
concave function of the number of animals placed Hit. For example, this assumption is satisﬁed




; with η>0. (12)
Now we are in the position to state the following two results:
Proposition 1: The optimal decisions (H∗
it(θi),κ ∗




∂θi (θi) is positive if and only if the elasticity of survived animals with respect to risk
7In fact, the condition 2m
0 + m
00H>0 is satisﬁed in this case if Hit < 2η. We will check empirically that η

















Proof: See Appendix 6.1. ¤
Proposition 2: If the following conditions are satisﬁed:
p − φwF + α>0
φwF − α − w0

















then, the optimal decisions (H∗
it(θi),κ ∗









Proof: See Appendix 6.2. ¤
In order to test these propositions, θi needs to be identiﬁed at least up to a scale. The







∂θi < 0,o ri f
∂κ∗
0it
∂θi and (1 +
∂ lnHs∗
it
∂ lnθi ) have opposite signs.
3.2.2 Contracts optimality and reservation utility
Now, let’s replace e∗
it by its analytical expression from (9) in the expression of the certainty
equivalent measure of agent’s utility Wit(Rit (Hit,κ 0it),e ∗
it):
Wit(Rit (Hit,κ 0it),e ∗











− γλ˜ βit. (13)
Referring back to expressions for contract parameters (4) and (5), the measurement error in
the weight of animals at the end of the production period implies that ˜ αit is observed with
an error but not ˜ βit. Let’s assume that κit is thus measured with an i.i.d. error εit that is
18supposed to be uncorrelated with κ0it, Hit, and independent across observations. The observed
weight of ﬁnished animals is therefore f κit = κit +εit and then the observed variable is ˜ αit +ςit
where ςit = α(1 − mit)Hitεit since
˜ αit + ςit = α[f κit (1 − mit) − κ0it]Hit = α[κit (1 − mit) − κ0it]Hit + α(1 − mit)Hitεit.
Choosing ˜ α∗












Taking into account the fact that the participation constraint (11) is binding, we obtain that
˜ α∗
it = Ωi + γλ˜ β
∗
it + ςit (14)
with E (ςit|κ∗
0it,H∗
it,Ωi)=α(1 − mit)HitE (εit|κ∗
0it,H∗
it,Ωi)=0and where Ωi = Wi −
(1−γ)2
2σ2θi .
With data on performance fit and on ˜ α∗
it, κ0it,H∗
it and ˜ β
∗
it, we can state the following result:
Proposition 3:
• The agent’s reservation utility is a weighted sum (with unknown weight γ)o fΩi identiﬁed
from (14) and Ψi =
1−γ
2σ2θi that will be identiﬁed from (17) using performance data:
Wi = Ωi +( 1− γ)Ψi.
• If Ωi (θi) is non increasing in θi,t h e no n ec a nr e j e c tt h a tWi (θi) is increasing in θi (even
weakly).
• The lower bound W
i
inf a n dt h eu p p e rb o u n dW
i




inf ≤ Wi ≤ W
i
sup = Ωi + Ψi. (15)
• The parameter γλ is identiﬁed.
Proof: See appendix 6.3.¤
Proposition 3 shows that the assumption that contracts are optimal allows the identiﬁcation
of the lower and the upper bound for the reservation utility of agents. With this, one can test






4I d e n t i ﬁcation and Estimation Results
Using the panel data described before, we can now estimate the structural model we developed
so far. Substituting (9) in (7) yields the formula for the diﬀerence between the benchmark feed






which by taking logs gives the following equation
ln((φ − fit) ˜ βit)=l n (
1 − γ
σ2θi
)+l n ( uit). (17)
The individual level parameters θi in (17) can be estimated with a linear regression including
growers ﬁxed eﬀects. Notice, however, that θi’s are identiﬁed only up to scale since ln(
1−γ
σ2 ) −
ln(θi)=l n ( k
1−γ
σ2 ) − ln(kθi) for any k>0. Nevertheless, once the estimates of θi are known,
one can test for the heterogeneity of risk aversions across growers.
Note that another choice of speciﬁcation would also be possible by allowing growers hetero-
geneity to aﬀect their cost of eﬀort γ in which case the individual level heterogeneity parameter
would have to be interpreted as a ratio of cost of eﬀort to risk aversion (
1−γi
θi ). However, for
simplicity, we prefer to ﬁrst assume that all growers have the same cost of eﬀort γ.
The estimation of (17) shows that the unexplained variance accounts for around 50% of the
total variance. An F test that all ln(θi) are equal strongly rejects the homogeneity of growers
with respect to their risk aversion (F(121,680) = 5.34). The distribution of risk aversion
parameters θi displayed in Figure 1 is characterized by the fact that the median risk aversion
is 43% higher than the value of the 25th percentile of the distribution and 21% lower than the
20value of the 75th percentile of the distribution. These measures are independent of the scale of
coeﬃcients and show substantial heterogeneity across growers regarding their risk aversion.
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4.1 Performance
Our next objective is to test whether the theoretical implications of the model are consistent
with the data. We ﬁrst check whether the suﬃcient conditions on the mortality function
mit(Hit) that we introduced in Assumption 2 are satisﬁed. The data does not allow us to
estimate function m(.) and its ﬁrst and second derivatives non-parametrically because the
sample size is not large enough for such a demanding estimation but one can use the parametric
form (12) for mortality from which it follows that
Hit = −ηln(1 − mit)
and then estimate the parameter η by least squares. The results show that b η =2 6 ,300 (with
the standard error of 445) and the functional ﬁti sq u i t eg o o dw i t hR2 =7 9 % . When estimating
21η’s that vary across feeder pigs type, the R2 goes up to 85% while the estimates of η are 26,000
(s.e. 638); 27,300 (s.e. 724); and 15,100 (s.e. 708) for the three diﬀerent types of animals.
Notice that for the mortality function in (12), the assumption that led to our Proposition, i.e.,
2m0 +m00H>0 is satisﬁed if H<2η. Since the observed values of Hit are between 1,100 and
1,500 per house, this condition is easily satisﬁed. Controlling for the density of animals in the
housing facilities, the prediction of the mortality rate is even better and almost perfect.
Next, using the structural estimates of risk aversion parameters θi,w ew a n tt ot e s tt h e
main propositions of the paper. We want to test whether the integrator supplies more feeder
pigs to less risk averse growers by looking at the relationship between Hit and θi. First, non-
parametric tests of independence between Hit and θi,o rt h ea v e r a g eo v e rc o n t r a c t so fHit for
grower i and θi show that independence is strongly rejected. The Spearman rank correlation
coeﬃcient is negative and strongly signiﬁcant. Next, a non-parametric estimate of E (Hit | θi)
obtained by using a standard kernel regression method (shown in Figure 2) clearly indicates
that E (Hit | θi) is a strictly decreasing function of θi, and so does a linear regression model
(whose results are not reported here).
Next, although the scale of risk aversion is not identiﬁed, the elasticity of the number
of animals placement with respect to risk aversion is uniquely identiﬁed. A non parametric
estimation of E (lnHit | lnθi) s h o w st h a tw ec a n n o tr e j e c tt h a tt h i sf u n c t i o ni sl i n e a r( s e e
appendix 7.1) and the linear regression gives the estimate
∂E(lnHit|lnθi)
∂ lnθi = −0.84 with a robust
standard error of 0.02. This result shows that a 10% increase in absolute risk aversion results
in a 8.4% decrease in the number of animals that the integrator would place on the grower’s
farm. Based on Proposition 2, this result suggests that the weight of feeder pigs should increase
with growers’ risk aversion. The result is conﬁrmed by looking at the elasticity of survived
animals with respect to risk aversion, i.e.,
∂E(lnHs
it|lnθi)
∂ lnθi = −0.85(0.02) > −1, which based on
Proposition 1, says that the weight of the incoming feeder pigs (κ0) that the integrator places
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on a grower’s farm would increase with risk aversion if and only if the elasticity of survived
animals with respect to θi is greater than −1. In fact the results show that \ ∂ lnκ0it
∂ lnθi =0 .04(0.01).
A non-parametric estimate of the weight of incoming feeder pigs conditional on the risk aversion
parameter shown in Figure 3 clearly indicates that E(κ0it | θi) is an increasing function of θi.
4.2 Cost of moral hazard
The welfare cost of moral hazard emanates from the observability problem and the fact that
contract growers are risk averse and face uncertain income streams. The volatility of income
constitutes a direct real cost to growers and can be thought of as the cost of moral hazard in the
sense that without moral hazard, integrators could pay growers constant wages to compensate
them for their eﬀort in case eﬀort were observable and veriﬁable. However, obtaining the
exact welfare estimates of the cost of moral hazard is impossible because the marginal cost of
eﬀort (γ) and the absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient are not identiﬁed (θi is identiﬁed only up
to scale). Nevertheless, it is interesting to look at the relationship between the mean and the
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variance of growers’ revenues and their risk aversion parameters. First, 60% of the variance
of total payments to growers, Rit, is explained by the between-growers variance.S e c o n d , a
linear regression shows a signiﬁcant negative relationship between the within-grower variance
(estimated for each grower along the time dimension of the panel data) and risk aversion. Also,
the mean payment is signiﬁcantly decreasing with risk aversion. The grower level variability
of income is such that the average standard deviation is $3,960 with a median of $2,856. The
above results point out that the cost of moral hazard to growers is likely to be substantial.
Moreover, it is important to note that the costs of asymmetric information arise not only
from the fact that part of the performance risk (in terms of feed conversion) has to be borne
by growers (because they have to be given the correct incentives), but also from the fact that
the integrator allocates diﬀerent number of animals to diﬀerent growers according to their risk
aversions. We anticipate that more risk averse growers would have lower revenues because,
ceteris paribus, they perform worse in terms of the feed conversion ratio (which reduces their
bonus payment), but also because they receive fewer animals compared to the less risk averse
24growers.
Notice however that the relationship between grower risk aversion and his expected revenue
is theoretically ambiguous. Looking at the equilibrium eﬀort equation (9), it follows that the
optimal eﬀort decreases with higher risk aversion but also with ˜ β and hence Hit. Therefore,
since more risk averse growers receive fewer animals (Hit), the overall comparative statics
eﬀect of risk aversion on the unconditional optimal eﬀort and hence on the expected revenue
is undetermined.
The empirical results show that the revenues of more risk-averse growers are less volatile
but, also, on average lower. Table 2 shows the average of the means and standard deviations
of each grower’s revenue Rit for diﬀerent percentiles of the distribution of θi. Except for the
50-60 percentiles of the distribution, the relationship shows a negative link between the mean
and the variance of grower revenue and risk aversion. This empirical result shows that the net
eﬀe c to fr i s ka v e r s i o no nr e v e n u ei sn e g a t i v e .T h i sn e te ﬀect is a combination of the indirect
eﬀect of risk aversion on the equilibrium values of H and κ0 via the ﬁxed component and the
incentive power of the payment and the direct eﬀect of risk aversion on performance through
eﬀort provision.
4.3 Heterogeneity in reservation utilities
To address the issue of growers’ reservation utilities we estimate equation (14) with observations
on ˜ α∗
it and ˜ β
∗
it. Using generalized least squares, we obtain consistent estimates of {Ωi}i=1,..,I
and γλ.T h e e s t i m a t e o f γλ shows a signiﬁcant and positive value (c γλ =0 .80 (0.006)),
indirectly conﬁrming the validity of the model. Recall that both the cost of eﬀort and the
ability parameters need to be positive, so their estimated positive product does not reject
the model. An F test that all Ωi are equal strongly rejects the null hypothesis, with F(121,
679)=16.11 and p-value=0.000. Also, remembering that the parameter γ could be grower
speciﬁc, we estimated equation (14) using grower speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients for ˜ β
∗
it. Unfortunately,
25Table 2: Risk Aversion and Revenue
% Distribution of θi Mean Rit (in US$) Standard Deviation Rit
0-10% 32 709 6 491
10-20% 25 087 5 914
20-30% 23 623 3 969
30-40% 21 227 3 195
40-50% 17 947 2 197
50-60% 18 408 5 971
60-70% 12 906 2 570
70-80% 12 651 3 164
80-90% 11 466 1 999
90-100% 10 995 1 949
due to insuﬃcient number of observations all these coeﬃcients are imprecisely estimated. A
test of homogeneity across individuals is not rejected but not very convincingly given the
test’s lack of power. However, splitting the sample randomly in two parts and repeating the
estimation of (14) on both sub-samples gives similar values for c γλ that are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from each other. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that the cost of eﬀort parameter
γ is common to all growers.
With the obtained estimates, we look at the relationship between Ωi and θi. A linear





sup and θi. A non parametric estimate of the relationship between Ωi and
θi s h o w st h a ti ti sc l e a r l yd e c r e a s i n g . S i n c eΩi consists of two components, the reservation
utility Wi and −(1 − γ)Ψi which is increasing in θi, it follows that the reservation utility Wi
has to be decreasing in θi. This result implies that agents with higher risk aversion have lower
outside opportunities because of lower reservation utilities. Figure 4 shows a non parametric
26Figure 4: Nonparametric estimate of E(W
i
inf | θi) and E(W
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estimate of the upper and lower bound estimates of the reservation utility8.
Finally, notice that if we considered the fact that agents could take into account the risk-
iness of the ﬁnal weight of animals κit, then we should have modiﬁed the agent’s revenue
certainty equivalent by adding the mean-variance value of this additional risk denoted as ηit.
Assuming that this random shock is of mean zero and constant variance across agents, the












One can show easily that in this new model, Ωi would become Ωi = Wi −
(1−γ)2
2σ2θi + θivar[ηit].
Although, this approach would weaken the possibility to identify the agents’ reservation util-
ities (because the absolute value of θi is not identiﬁed), the additional term θivar[ηit] being
increasing in θi, would reinforce the fact that Wi has to be decreasing in θi when Ωi decreases
8The reason why it seems that only one curve appears on the graph is that, given the scale, these two curves





sup is very small compared to Ωi.
27in θi, which has been empirically conﬁrmed. Thus, this additional complexity would conﬁrm
the negative relationship between risk aversion θi and reservation utility Ωi.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we studied the question of optimal contracting under moral hazard when agents
have heterogenous preferences. In this case, heterogeneity calls for individually designed con-
tracts, which stands in sharp contrast to what have been frequently observed in the real world.
The examples of principals using seemingly uniform contracts when dealing with heterogenous
agents are found in many agricultural sectors, particularly in livestock production contracts
for broilers, turkeys, and hogs. Two main elements of all agricultural production contracts are
the payment mechanism and the division of responsibilities for providing inputs. The payment
mechanism consists almost always of a variable piece rate with bonuses for the eﬃcient use
of the principal-supplied inputs and is always the same for all agents. However, contracts
never specify the quantity and quality of the integrator-supplied inputs to each grower. We
show that the observed contracts are only nominally uniform, and that the principals are
using their discretion when it comes to matching inputs with agents of diﬀerent preferences
(risk aversion). Using this variation in contract variables, the principal in fact manages to
design the individualized contracts that are tailored to ﬁt the individual growers’ preferences
or characteristics.
The paper has two conceptually distinct parts. In the ﬁrst part we develop an analytical
framework for the econometric estimation of the degree of risk aversion of contract producers
and carry out its empirical estimation using the individual growers performance data from the
swine industry. We found that contract farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk
aversion parameters and that this heterogeneity aﬀects the principal’s allocation of production
inputs across farmers. The main characteristic of this part of the paper is that it takes the
28observed contract as given and model the behavior of the agents under the observed contractual
terms without using any optimality argument about the contract design.
The obtained results are then used to look at the cost of moral hazard associated with
growers’ risk aversion. We show that the costs of asymmetric information arise not only from
the fact that part of the performance risk has to be borne by growers (because they have to
be given the correct incentives to perform), but also from the fact that the integrator allocates
diﬀerent number of animals to diﬀerent growers according to their risk aversions. More risk
averse growers will have lower expected revenues because on average they perform worse, but
also because they receive fewer animals compared to the less risk averse growers. These results
were conﬁrmed in a variety of diﬀerent empirical tests. They provide evidence about the
risk sharing - incentives trade-oﬀ underlying contractual relationships under moral hazard and
uncertainty.
In the second part of the paper, we look at the principal’s decisions and contract design,
and assuming that contracts are optimal, we derive the implications of the principal’s optimal
decisions. Compared to other papers on applied contract theory, this part of the paper stands
out in that we use both the assumption of contract optimality and the fact that the contract
payments are accurately observed in the data. Using the contract optimality assumption as
an identifying restriction, we were able to obtain estimates of the bounds on agents’ reserva-
tion utilities (although point estimates are not obtained because the cost parameter remains
unidentiﬁed). We show that farmers with higher risk aversion have lower outside opportunities
and hence lower reservation utilities.
Finally, some interesting research directions can be outlined. Given access to adequate
empirical data, adding the problem of adverse selection to the existing problem of moral
hazard would present an interesting extension. Although the assumption that the principal
can perfectly observe agents’ types in this industry seems realistic, given the repetitive nature
29of contracting between the principal and the same group of agents, the question of endogenizing
the distribution of agent types willing to contract with the principal would be interesting. This
w o u l da m o u n tt oa l l o w i n ga g e n t st oc h o o s eb e t w e e nd i ﬀerent types of contracts. For example,
keeping the research focus on contracting in agriculture, it would be interesting to look into
choices that farmers make when deciding to specialize in the contract production of various
types of animals or crops. One example could be signing a contract for the production of
hatching eggs or the production of broiler chickens in cases where both contracts are oﬀered
by the same integrator in the same area. Another example may be in the swine sector where
the choices can be made among signing a contract for the production of ﬁnished hogs, versus
signing a farrow-to-ﬁnish, or a wean-to-ﬁnish contract. Besides the methodological diﬃculties,
the main problem with this type of research is to ﬁnd data on multiple contracts settlements
from the same geographical area. With appropriate data one could fully analyze the initial
matching between agents characteristics and the types of activity, making the distribution
of agents’s preferences and reservation utilities endogenous. This new step in the empirical
research on contract theory will help understand the full industry structure of vertical contracts
in many areas of agriculture and beyond.
306 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Using (3) and the optimal grower eﬀort (9), removing the argument of mit for notational
convenience, the integrator’s expected proﬁt becomes



















































































Taking derivative of the condition ∂Eπit
















H (κ0it)(θi(1 − mit)Hit)
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H (κ0it) > 0, ∂κ0it
∂θi has the sign of

















=( 1 − mit)Hit
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∂θi > 0 if and only if
∂ ln[(1−mit)Hit]
∂ lnθi > −1.¤
316.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Taking the derivative of the ﬁrst order condition ∂Eπit
∂Hit =0with respect to θi,w eh a v e


























Given Assumption 2, we know that the number of survived animals is a concave function of
the number of placed animals, ∂2
∂H2
it
[(1 − mit)Hit] < 0. Also, prices and parameters are such
that [p − φwF + α] > 0 (conﬁrmed by the data) and [φwF − α − w0
H (κ0it)] < 0,d u et ot h e
properties of the cost function for feeder pigs. Notice that in order for the second condition
to hold, it is suﬃcient that the marginal cost of producing feeder pigs be at least as large
as the feeding cost (i.e. the target feed conversion ratio (φ) times the price of feed (wF)).
This assumption cannot be checked within the existing data set because, as explained before,
the price data has been constructed from secondary sources and the feeder pigs prices are
market averages across all weights that were transacted in that time period. However, a casual
inspection of the feeder pig prices for various weight categories published by USDA (2004)
conﬁrms the assumption that w0
H (κ) is large enough to oﬀset the feed cost φwF observed in





























































































∂θi < 0 implies ∂κ0it





























almost zero and the elasticity of κ0it with respect to θi is \ ∂ lnκ0it
∂ lnθi =0 .04 (0.01).T h ee s t i m a t e d
mortality function is such that
m0
it
(1−mit)2 is very small. If the mortality function is such that we
can cancel this term because
m0
it
(1−mit)2 ' 0 then equation (18) implies that ∂κ0it
∂θi and ∂Hit
∂θi will
be of opposite signs.¤




2σ2θi is an increasing function of θi, one can reject that Wi (θi) is increasing in θi





and thus (15). As Ωi is identiﬁed from (14) and
1−γ
σ2θi is identiﬁed by (17), which also identiﬁes
Ψi =
1−γ
2σ2θi, the bounds on inequality (15) are identiﬁed.¤
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7.1 Additional results
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